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Between the Species
Extending the Impairment Argument
to Sentient Non-Human Animals

ABSTRACT
This paper offers a new argument against raising and killing sentient
non-human animals for food. It is immoral to non-lethally impair
sentient non-human animals for pleasure, and since raising and killing sentient animals for gustatory pleasure impairs them to a much
greater degree, it also is wrong. This is because of the impairment
principle: if it is immoral to impair an organism to some degree, then,
ceteris paribus, it is immoral to impair it to a higher degree. This argument is structurally analogous to Perry Hendricks’s impairment
argument for the immorality of abortion. However, the argument is
more defensible applied to the raising and killing of sentient nonhuman animals for food because of the sentience of the non-human
animals involved. I explain how the argument is distinct from other
pro-vegan, pro-vegetarian arguments.
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Perry Hendricks (2019a, 2019b), along with Bruce Blackshaw (2020, 2021), defends the impairment argument for the
immorality of abortion. It relies on two seemingly straightforward premises. The first is the claim that to knowingly impair
a fetus with fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS) is immoral, and the
second is the impairment principle: if impairing an organism
to some degree is immoral, then, ceteris paribus, impairing it
to a higher degree is also immoral. Given the plausibility of the
first claim, and the further claim that abortion more severely
impairs a fetus than FAS, it follows that abortion is immoral.
Objections and responses have been offered, most centering on
the impairment principle’s ceteris paribus clause. In this paper,
I set these issues about abortion aside and instead defend an
impairment argument for the immorality of raising and killing
non-human animals for food. After setting out the anti-abortion impairment argument, I motivate an impairment argument
for the immorality of raising and killing animals for food. I
then argue that the objections to anti-abortion impairment argument can be satisfactorily responded to when considering
the extended argument to sentient non-human animals. With
the argument defended, I explain how it differs from other antimeat eating arguments. The result of this paper is a new argument against raising and killing animals for gustatory pleasure.

The Anti-Abortion Impairment Argument
An upshot of the impairment argument for the immorality of
abortion is that it shies away from claims to fetal personhood,
fetal rights or other well-trodden, contentious claims. Following Hendricks (2019a), the argument can be set out as follows:
1. It is immoral to impair a fetus by knowingly causing fetal
alcohol syndrome (FAS).
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2. If it is immoral to impair an organism to some degree,
then, ceteris paribus, it is immoral to impair it to a higher degree.
3. Abortion impairs a fetus more than FAS.
4. Thus, abortion is immoral.
Premises 1 and 3 are relatively strong. Few would deny that
knowingly causing FAS is wrong. To cause FAS one has to engage in excessive, sustained drinking, resulting in mild to severe physical or mental impairment. To knowingly cause FAS
is wrong, in part, because of its effects on the fetus, namely,
FAS impairs the developing fetus by inhibiting its ability to
function properly. If knowingly causing FAS is immoral because of its effect on the fetus’s ability to function, then clearly
abortion impairs a fetus more than FAS: life is a necessary condition to normal function, so death eliminates all of a fetus’s
abilities, not just some. To abort a fetus, Hendricks explains,
“is to completely limit all of her abilities, whereas to give her
FAS is to limit only some of her abilities” (Hendricks 2019a,
247).
Much of the literature focuses on the impairment principle
in premise 2. To impair a creature is to inhibit its ability to
properly function. Examples of impairment include cutting off
someone’s arm, blinding someone, or injecting someone with
a drug that impairs her normal functioning. Of course, not all
impairment is morally wrong. Injecting a child with a vaccine
that causes mild nausea, thereby impairing her ability to function for a time, is justified by the good that results from being
vaccinated. The impairment principle thus contains a crucial
ceteris paribus clause. Three clarifications are in order. First,
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the impairments have to be similar in kind, as Hendricks explains:
let us take the ceteris paribus clause to be met only
if the relevant details surrounding the impairment in
the antecedent are sufficiently similar to the relevant
details surrounding the impairment in the consequent.
(Hendricks 2019a, 247)
Abortion is a greater impairment because it impairs fetal
physical and mental function to a higher degree than FAS
does—both impair physical and mental capacities. Second, it
has to be the case that there is not a sufficiently good reason
that justifies the greater impairment but not the lesser impairment. For instance, if there is a “uniquely valuable good” attainable by the severe impairment but not the less-severe impairment, then the severe impairment can be justified while the
less-severe impairment is not (Hendricks 2019a, 247). Third,
to determine whether a reason justifies the greater impairment,
Blackshaw and Hendricks (2021) offer a test: if the proposed
reason for the greater impairment does not justify the slighter
impairment, then it is not a sufficient justifying reason. This
is plausible, for it is difficult to see how a reason can justify a
greater impairment but not a lesser impairment.

The Argument Extended to Sentient Non-Human
Animals
Responses to the impairment argument for the immorality
of abortion have been offered, and it is not my goal to defend
or criticize the anti-abortion argument; rather, my goal is to
defend the argument as it applies to raising and killing sentient
non-human animals for food. Joona Räsänen observes that the
argument can be applied to animals, but thinks this very fact
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reveals “the problem of the impairment principle” (Räsänen
2020, 863). By contrast, I do not think the fact that a structurally similar argument can apply to animals is a problem, nor
do I think Räsänen’s criticism—discussed below—is compelling. In this section, I set out the argument and motivate the
premises.
A strength of the argument defended here is that it does not
rely on a claim of animal rights or moral considerability; rather,
it relies on an observation of the wrongness of causing sentient
non-human animal impairment for pleasure and application of
the impairment principle to raising and killing sentient nonhuman animals for gustatory pleasure. The argument is formalized as follows:
1*. It is immoral to cause non-life ending impairment to sentient non-human animals for pleasure.
2*. If it is immoral to impair a sentient creature to some degree, then, ceteris paribus, it is immoral to impair it to a higher
degree.
3*. Raising and killing sentient non-human animals for gustatory pleasure impairs them more than causing non-life ending impairment for pleasure.
4*. Thus, raising and killing sentient non-human animals for
gustatory pleasure is immoral.
The premises are defensible. Premise 2* limits the impairment principle to sentient creatures, not organisms as in premise 2, for the simple reason that farm animals are sentient, i.e.,
experience pain and pleasure, and have desires and intentions.
Because premise 2* is a slightly modified version of the origi-
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nal principle, I will not discuss it further. (More will be said
in defense of it applied to sentient non-human animals below.)
Support for premise 1* can be drawn from our collective revulsion to dog fighting or cock fighting, events that involve
animals in mutual mutilation resulting in immense pain and
subsequent suffering, not to mention the pain and suffering involved in training them to fight. Sometimes animal fighting
results in death, but this need not be the case. The victorious
animal may live to fight another day, albeit with injuries (e.g.,
broken bones, gapping wounds, fear, depression, and other impairments). Other examples of impairing animals for pleasure,
not necessity, are easy to come by: kicking a puppy, burning
a cat, blinding a horse, and other forms of animal abuse. If
public outcry over instances of animal abuse are an indication,
such activities are morally wrong, and they are wrong, in part,
because of their effects on the abused animals and the lack of
a justifying reason for these effects. Animal abuse results in
physical and emotional impairments not conducive to the proper functioning of the sentient animal, and their ensuing suffering is not justified by the fact that someone enjoys abusing
them. I am aware of no ethicist who denies premise 1*, as that
would be to court a moral callousness few are willing to accept.
Premise 3* observes that the raising and killing of sentient
non-human animals for gustatory pleasure impairs animals
more than non-life-threatening animal abuse impairs animals.
The premise is limited to situations where people do not need
to eat animal flesh to live a flourishing, healthy life but do so
for reasons of taste or convenience. The premise is plausible for
two reasons. First, while blinding a chicken impairs the chicken’s ability to function properly, killing the chicken more severely impairs its ability to function—the chicken can no longer see, touch, feel, taste, and so on. Death eliminates its ability
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to function altogether, as living is a necessary prerequisite to
proper functioning. So, if kicking a pig and breaking its leg is
wrong, in part, because of the ensuing physical impairment,
then killing a pig is worse because of the ensuing elimination
of all of its abilities. Second, premise 3* is more plausible than
premise 3 in the anti-abortion argument because 3* is not limited to the act of killing only—it also includes the process of
raising animals on farms. The process of raising and killing
animals for food, especially animals involved in industrialized
farming, which produces the overwhelming majority of meat
consumed, involves these animals in a lifetime of impairment
resulting in misery and suffering. David DeGrazia offers the
following example of a typical hen:
Hen X begins life in a crowded incubator. After moving to a shed, where she stays until mature enough to
lay eggs, she is taken to a battery cage made entirely of
wire, where she lives most of her life. (Lacking commercial value, male chicks are ground up alive, gassed,
or suffocated.) Hen X’s cage is so crowded that she
cannot fully stretch her wings. Although important for
feeding, exploring, and preening, her beak has been
partly cut of, through sensitive tissue, in order to limit
the damage caused by pecking cage mates—a behavior induced by overcrowding. For several hours before
laying an egg, Hen X paces nervously, instinctively
seeking a nest she will not find. At egg laying time,
she stands on a sloped, uncomfortable wire floor. Lack
of exercise, unnatural conditions, and demands for
extreme productivity—she lays 250 eggs per year—
weaken her bones. … When considered spent at age
two, she is jammed into a crate and transported in a
truck— without food, water, or protection from the el-
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ements—to a slaughterhouse, where handling is rough.
At her destination, Hen X is shackled upside down on
a conveyor belt before an automated knife slices her
throat. Because the Humane Slaughter Act does not
apply to poultry, she is fully conscious throughout this
process. (DeGrazia 2009, 151)
As DeGrazia’s description makes clear, raising hens on
modern industrialized farms impairs their normal functions,
from inhibiting natural behaviors to stunting their physical
growth and promoting stress. Descriptions and other examples
such as this one are easy to come by and well-documented;
few dispute the reality of factory farming. It is also noteworthy that more “humane” farming involves practices that impair
animals: cramped living conditions, dehorning, castration, ear
clipping, unsafe travel to slaughterhouse, and so on (Solis 2021;
DeGrazia 2016; Engel Jr. 2016; Foer 2009). Accordingly, raising animals for gustatory pleasure impairs them as much as, if
not more than, other kinds of animal abuse.
Premises 1* through 3* collectively show that raising and
killing sentient non-human animals for gustatory pleasure is
immoral. Just as animal abuse is wrong because of its effects
on the animal, so raising and killing animals is wrong because
of its effects on animals: both impair their ability to function,
raising and killing them for food more so. This conclusion has
far reaching ramifications, for not only does it show that factory
farming is immoral, it shows that humane farming is immoral
as well. Moreover, since the vast majority of meat available in
the supermarket is from sentient farm animals (e.g., pigs, chickens, cows), a practical implication of the impairment argument
is that those of us who are financially and practically able to
ought to refrain from consuming meat on the grounds that we
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should not support immoral practices. Just as it is wrong to pay
to watch someone else orchestrate a dog fighting ring, so it is
wrong to pay for someone else to raise and slaughter an animal
when one does not have to. The following premise, articulated
and defended by DeGrazia (2009) and Engel Jr. (2016), appears
to be plausible:
5. We should not support immoral practices when there are
other readily-available options.
Since many of us in affluent societies have ready access to
cheap, nutritionally adequate plant-based foods, we should not
financially support the immoral practice of raising and killing
animals for food. Premises 1* through 5 show that we should
not consume animals raised and slaughtered for gustatory pleasure.

Defending the Anti-Meat Eating Argument
Objections to the impairment argument for the immorality
of abortion are numerous. As noted above, most focus on the
impairment principle, arguing that there is a significant difference between FAS and abortion. My goal in this section is to
show that these objections to the anti-abortion argument are
not compelling against the argument presented in defense of
non-human animals. I respond to six objections.
a. Particularly Valuable Goods
Hendricks explains that the ceteris paribus clause is satisfied
when the greater impairment but not the minor impairment results in “a particularly valuable good” (Hendricks 2019a, 247).
Räsänen (2020) and Pickard (2020) argue that there are goods
of abortion that are not procurable by FAS, including a lack
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of pain for the future person, not being a parent, one less person on the planet, and so on. Applied to non-human animals,
it might be argued that there are goods available only through
the raising and killing of farm animals that are not available
by non-lethally impairing them. Räsänen (2020) proposes that
raising and killing an animal for gustatory pleasure results in
the valuable good of edible meat, and this may be taken to justify the practice.
The problem, of course, is that meat is not a uniquely valuable good, for there are numerous other sources of food that
are just as delicious and nutritious. People do not need to consume animals to live a healthy, enjoyable life. After describing
many successful competitive vegan athletes, Mylan Engel Jr.
explains the scholarly consensus:
studies have led the American Dietetic Association
(ADA) and the Dietitians of Canada (DoC), the two
leading nutritional organizations in North America,
to conclude that appropriately planned vegetarian diets are “healthful, nutritionally adequate, and provide
health benefits in the prevention and treatment of certain diseases.” The ADA and DoC further observe that
well-planned vegan and vegetarian diets “are appropriate for all stages of the life cycle, including during
pregnancy, lactation, infancy, childhood, and adolescence (Engel Jr. 2016, 15).
There is a general consensus among dieticians based on cumulative research that eating meat, which is something people
in affluent societies tend to do in excess, is inimical to our wellbeing: meat consumption may contribute to the impairment of
our proper functioning. To take but one example, Engel Jr. dis-
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cusses a Loma Linda study that found that male meat-eaters
have a 50% chance of having a heart attack compared to a 7.5%
chance among vegans (Engel Jr. 2016, 15). Not only is a plantbased diet conducive to health, it can be just as convenient as a
meat-based diet. Most, if not all, restaurants in affluent societies have plant-based dishes available, and preparing a plantbased dish can take as long as, if not less time than, a meatbased dish. In addition to plant and grain-based foods, there are
plant-based meat alternatives (e.g., Impossible Burger) readily
available and there will likely be in vitro meat, meat that does
not require the raising and killing of animals, readily available in the near future. People in affluent societies with access
to cost-comparable plant-based alternatives evidently continue
to consume meat for reasons of gustatory pleasure, not convenience or necessity, and gustatory pleasure is not a valuable
good that is available only by raising and killing sentient nonhuman animals.
b. Different Motivations
Another objection to the anti-abortion argument is that the
ceteris paribus clause is not met because women’s reasons for
getting an abortion differ from reasons for drinking during
pregnancy: women might continue to drink for addiction-related reasons, while they might pursue an abortion for financial- and physical-related reasons (Pickard 2019). These other
reasons might justify abortion but not FAS. Applied to animals,
it might be objected that people who cause non-lethal impairments to animals have different motivations than people who
raise and kill non-human animals for food: participants in dog
fighting, say, do so for entertainment, while farmers are trying
to make a living. Financial reasons might therefore justify raising and killing animals for food.
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This objection is not compelling because the argument can
be reformulated. Imagine a person, Lulu, who runs a secretive,
selective animal abuse organization for the rich and wealthy.
People who want to anonymously abuse animals pay Lulu to
arrange the opportunity to do so. She brings the desired animalvictim to a secret place and is able to ensure anonymity for the
abuser. Let us stipulate further that Lulu has no other source of
income. Despite financially relying on this business, it seems
pretty clear that Lulu’s treatment of animals is immoral, and
that financial gain does not justify creating opportunities for
animal abuse. In other words, the following restatement of the
first premise is plausibly true:
1**. It is immoral to cause non-life ending impairment to
sentient non-human animals for financial gain.
Support for this is drawn from the effects of the impairments
involved (e.g., bodily mutilation, pain, and stress) and recognition that financial motivations do not justify such impairments:
Lulu’s life does not depend on her treatment of animals, for
she could get another job. Lulu’s actions are in stark contrast
to a veterinarian who may also cause non-life ending impairments to animals for financial gain. The difference is that the
veterinarian’s actions also are in the animal’s or society’s interests, whereas Lulu’s is not. No animal has an interest in being
abused whereas all animals have an interest in being vaccinated or a collective interest in being spade or neutered. There
are justifying reasons for veterinarian-caused impairments that
are lacking in Lulu’s case. Applying 1** to the argument creates the relevant symmetry behind the motivations, thereby not
allowing for the ceteris paribus clause to apply. Since Lulu’s
actions are immoral, it follows that so are the actions of those
who raise and kill animals for food.
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c. Financial Considerations
Dustin Crummett (2020) argues that the ceteris paribus
clause is not met because pregnancy is much more demanding
than not drinking: pregnancy takes an immense physical, emotional, and even financial toll on a woman, whereas refraining from excessive, continuous drinking does not. This burden
creates a reason that justifies abortion but not FAS. Applied
to animals, it cannot plausibly be maintained that transitioning to a plant-based diet is especially burdensome, for it is not:
plant-based alternatives are readily available in affluent societies, cost-comparable, if not cheaper, and just as easy to prepare;
moreover, adopting a plant-based diet promotes health better
than a meat-based diet. Still, it might be argued that it would
be much more burdensome for farmers to refrain from raising
and killing animals for food than for someone to refrain from
abusing an animal.
However, we can easily imagine Lulu’s situation to be similar—she has been involved in her secretive animal abuse organization for a long time, and “getting out” of the business
would be a drastic and burdensome change for her. Still, this
does not thereby show that her role in impairing animals is
justified. To make the point even more salient, slavery impairs
people and is immoral, in part, for that reason: slaves are unable to live a normal functioning life. To claim, as some did in
the past, that slavery is justified because of the economic value
of the practice for slave owners does not justify the impairment
that slavery resulted in for countless people. To impair a person requires good reason, not just any reason. This is what the
ceteris paribus clause indicates—some impairments are justified, others are not. Since Lulu’s impairing of animals for reasons of financial burden is unjustified, then so is the raising and
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killing animals for reasons of financial burden. After all, if it is
immoral to abuse animals for financial considerations, then it is
also immoral to raise and kill them for financial considerations.
d. Deny Impairments
Some have objected to the claim that abortion impairs a fetus: it is unclear how a non-existent creature is impaired by
non-existence and, assuming it is impaired, it is not evidently
impaired in the same way that FAS impairs a fetus (Blackshaw
2019). To bolster the claim that abortion impairs a fetus, Hendricks (2019b) and then Hendricks and Blackshaw (2021) appeal to the “future-like-ours” account of Don Marquis to explain why abortion and FAS might be thought to impair a fetus:
killing a fetus as well as causing FAS impairs it by limiting its
future like ours. Alex Gilham, in turn, argues that “fetuses that
will not be born have no chance of having an FLO in the first
place” (Gilham 2021, Abstract). Applied to animals, it might
be argued that death does not count as an impairment to farm
animals because they have no future once they die and there
is nothing “there” that is impaired. Animals that have been
abused live with the impairments.
There are important differences between abortion and nonhuman animals. First, farm animals are of a mature age when
they are killed, while a fetus is not. Sentient farm animals have
an interest in remaining alive, as evidenced by their apparent
distress, fear, stress, and nervousness on farms and in slaughterhouses, while it is unclear whether fetuses do. Just as killing a mature human being might be wrong, in part, because it
eliminates their future like ours, so also killing a mature nonhuman animal might be wrong, in part, because it eliminates
their future. Dan Hooley and Nathan Nobis argue that, “we se-
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riously harm these animals by depriving them of the possibility
of enjoyable and valuable future experiences.” (Hooley 2016,
96). Second, the process of raising animals for food impairs
them to a significant degree while they are alive, and killing
them for food is rarely instantaneous or quick—often it happens that the animals are conscious during the final stages of
death. Jonathan Safran Foer describes cattle slaughter methods:
Sometimes the bolt only dazes the animal, which either remains conscious or later wakes up as it is being “processed.” The effectiveness of the knocking
gun depends on its manufacture and maintenance, and
the skill of its application—a small hose leak or firing the gun before pressure sufficiently builds up gain
can reduce the force with which the bolt is released
and leave animals grotesquely punctured but painfully
conscious… [S]ome plants deliberately choose lesseffective knocking methods. The side effect is that a
higher percentage of animals require multiple knocks,
remain conscious, or wake up in processing. (Foer
2009, 229-230)
Even if farm animals are not impaired after death, they are
certainly impaired leading up to it. Finally, to cause an impairment is to be distinguished from the effects of the impairment.
To impair a creature is to hinder its ability to function properly,
so death maximally impairs a creature in virtue of eliminating
its existence. Accordingly, to cause the death of a creature is to
impair it, even though the effect is that the creature ceases to
exist. If someone breaks a pig’s leg, they impair the pig even if
the pig dies shortly thereafter for an unrelated reason; the pig is
impaired when her leg is broken. The argument defended here
posits that farm animals are impaired by death (and leading up
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to it, of course) even though they no longer experience impairment post-death.
e. Begging the Question
Another objection is that the argument begs the question.
Blackshaw (2019), Cummett (2020), and Pickard (2020) argue
that the anti-abortion argument assumes that a fetus is a person
with moral standing. To appreciate the motivation, consider
that the impairment principle applies to creatures but not, say,
cars. If I impair my car by kicking the door, I do not do something immoral. Why it is immoral to impair a creature but not
a car is that creatures but not cars have moral status, and of
course, if creatures have moral status, then it is wrong to impair them without good reason. The problem is that Hendricks
assumes that fetuses are among those creatures with moral
status, something that defenders of abortion deny. Applied to
animals, it might be argued that I assume all along that animals
have moral standing, which is precisely the claim at issue in
debates over eating animals.
I do not find this objection to be convincing because the antimeat eating argument is not wedded to a particular account of
the moral status of animals. Rather, the argument is wedded to
the immorality of animal abuse—something all agree to—and
the plausibility of the following principle:
Impairment Rationale: To impair a sentient creature
requires a good reason.
The Impairment Rationale principle captures our intuitions
about impairing human beings: it is unjustified to amputate
a foot because doing so would be fun, while the amputation
would be justified to save that person’s life. The Impairment
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Rationale principle also captures our intuitions about impairing sentient non-human animals: breaking a cat’s leg for fun
is unjustified, while breaking a cat’s leg to save its life from
an oncoming train is justified. Part of the reason why animal
abuse is immoral is because it impairs a sentient creature for no
good reason. There are many possible reasons why the Impairment Rationale principle is true: impairment involves pain, and
pain is morally considerable; sentience makes one morally considerable; sentience generates rights; and so on. What makes
the principle true is distinct from the claim that it is true. To
deny the principle is to court a moral callousness that few are
willing to court, as evidenced by a lack of defenders of animal
abuse, and the principle is acceptable to all ethical theories so
far as I can tell.
f. Deny Animal Moral Status
A final objection might be offered from a pro-meat eating position, namely, what makes sentient non-human animal
abuse wrong has nothing to do with its effects on the animal;
rather, according to Carl Cohen (2001) and Timothy Hsiao
(2015, 2017), what makes animal abuse immoral is that it reflects cruelty in the person who is abusing the animals—people
who abuse animals for sadistic pleasure are cruel individuals.
This reveals that impairing an animal is wrong only if the person who causes the impairment acts cruelly. However, a farmer
who raises and kills animals need not be manifesting a cruel
behavior. They can do this for all kinds of reasons, reasons that
do not manifest cruelty.
Two things can be said in response. First, this objection relies on the contentious position that sentient non-human animals do not have any moral considerability. To posit that the
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immorality of torturing a puppy for no good reason has absolutely nothing to do with the puppy strikes many people as
obviously wrong and in need of a strong defense. Torturing a
puppy is wrong, in part, because of the puppy’s experience, for
there is a profound difference between cutting open a rock and
cutting open a puppy. Cohen and Hsiao’s position thus leads
to counter-intuitive results. Imagine a person mutilates a cat
because she is curious about cat biology, not because of some
sadistic desire. Since this person does not manifest cruelty, Cohen and Hsiao are committed to the view that this person does
nothing morally wrong. Cohen and Hsiao might argue that the
person does do something wrong because she causes needless
suffering. Cohen explains that “we humans surely ought cause
no pain to them that cannot be justified… we, as moral human
beings, have the duty not to be cruel” (Cohen 2001, 46). This
leads to the second point, namely, since pain and impairments
are integrally related in sentient non-human animals, as will
be discussed below, it would seem that Cohen would agree to
the Impairment Rationale principle. If Cohen— and presumably Hsiao also—accept the Impairment Rationale principle
and agree that animal abuse for pleasure is immoral, then their
only recourse is to deny that the impairment principle applies
to raising and slaughtering animals for gustatory pleasure.
Stated differently, they must insist that food justifies the raising and slaughtering of animals. The point of disagreement is
whether gustatory pleasure, which is not unique to meat, justifies the impairments farm animals suffer. Because pleasure and
financial need does not justify animal abuse, I am inclined to
think that pleasure and financial need does not justify raising
and killing animals. Although beyond the scope of this paper,
the environmental costs of intensive animal farming, the detrimental health impact of high-meat diets, and the exploitation
of low-wage workers in slaughterhouses lend further support to

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 25, Issue 1

19
Christopher A. Bobier

my contention that neither pleasure nor financial justifies intensive animal farming.

A New Argument?
The preceding shows that the anti-meat eating impairment
argument is defensible. It does not rely on an account of animal rights or claims of animal personhood. It thus avoids welltrodden deontological and utilitarian grounds, and is not wedded to a particular ethical theory. Still, it bears similarity to a
common kind of anti-meat eating argument, which is referred
to as “The Basic Argument for Vegetarianism” (Rachels, 2011).
In this section, I explain how the impairment argument against
raising and killing animals (hereafter, impairment argument)
is distinguished from two versions of the basic argument for
vegetarianism (hereafter, the basic argument).
One version of the basic argument begins by noting that
instances of inflicted pain and suffering require moral justification. The next step in the basic argument is to observe that
factory farms cause an immense amount of pain and suffering to animals, ranging from physical pain to psychological
stress. Since people do not need to eat factory farm animals,
we need to look elsewhere in order to justify factory farming,
and it seems that people eat factory farm animals for preference, taste, or convenience. The issue is whether these reasons
are significant enough to justify the inflicted pain and suffering, and it certainly appears that the answer is no, as Stuart
Rachels observes: “The pleasure we get from eating meat is
not good enough, especially since we can enjoy eating other
things.” (Rachels 2011, 884). Therefore, factory farming is
morally wrong, and we should not financially support it. Practically speaking, since most all of the available meat is from a
factory farm, we should be vegetarian.

http://digitalcommons.calpoly.edu/bts/

Vol. 25, Issue 1

20
Christopher A. Bobier

Another version of the basic argument appeals to moral
consistency. The argument begins by noting, once again, that
instances of inflicted pain and suffering require moral justification. The next step is to highlight that instances of animal
abuse lack justification: that an animal abuser enjoys harming animals does not justify their behavior. The suffering is
“wholly unnecessary” and is therefore wrong (Francione and
Charlton 2015). But, the argument continues, industrialized
farming of animals for food results in a lot of inflicted pain and
suffering. Since, exceptionally rare cases aside, no one need to
consume animal flesh to live, the suffering of farm animals is
wholly unnecessary and therefore wrong. “So how exactly is
our consumption of animal products any different from Michael Vick’s dogfighting?” Gary Francione and Anna Charlton
ask; “The answer: it isn’t” (Francione 2015, 16). Since animal
abuse is wrong, so also is raising and killing animals for food.
We should not therefore contribute to the system of raising and
killing animals for food. We should be vegetarian.
The two versions of the basic argument bear a striking similarity to the impairment argument. All rely on theory-neutral
principles, one a principle about pain and suffering requiring
good reason, the other a principle about impairments requiring
good reason. The principles enjoy a significant degree of plausibility—it is hard to imagine someone denying that causing
pain or causing impairment requires good reason. There is also
significant overlap between the arguments. Some proponents
of the basic argument appeal to the “harms” involved in factory farming, and the term is used to refer to pain and suffering
but also to impairments of ability. DeGrazia’s description of
a typical hen includes numerous impairments of ability (e.g.,
pecking, nesting, mating). Impairment often leads to pain and
suffering, and vice versa: impairing an animal’s natural desire
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to nest leads to stress, while pain resulting from un-anaesthetized castration can impair an animal’s ability to move around.
Each of the arguments gain strength from the wrongness of
animal abuse and then highlight how the animal experience in
farming is abusive. Each argument strives for consistency—if
animal abuse is wrong, which it is, then so is raising and killing
animals for food; there is no special justifying reason for the
latter.
The similarities aside, the two arguments are importantly
different. The basic argument focuses on pain and suffering,
while the impairment argument focuses on impairments to
creaturely-specific functions, and while considerations of pain
and suffering may illuminate why impairments are morally
considerable, pain and impairment are distinct. A creature can
be impaired but not suffer or feel pain, and vice versa. For example, someone may cut off the leg of a cow that has been
genetically modified to not feel pain; the cow is impaired but
does not experience any pain. If the person cuts off the leg for
no reason other than sadistic pleasure, they do something immoral even though the animal experiences no pain. Likewise,
a person may cause pain without a corresponding impairment,
as when a dog is vaccinated with no adverse side-effects: there
is pain but no impairment of ability. That pain and suffering
are distinct from impairment reveals that the two arguments
differ in scope. The basic argument primarily focuses on the
pain and suffering involved in factory farming, while the impairment argument applies to all forms of raising and killing
animals for food. It is possible that there could be a form of
humane farming of animals that provides a relatively pain-free,
flourishing existence followed by a painless death. Although
not actualized anywhere, such farming would not be considered immoral according to the principles utilized in the basic
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argument; however, on account of impairing animals by killing them, such humane farming would be considered immoral.
The impairment argument is thus broader in scope than the
basic argument.

Conclusion
The ant-abortion argument lends itself to a new anti-meat
eating argument. Given the impairments involved in raising
and killing animals for food, not to mention the incontestable fact that farm animals are sentient, the premises of the
anti-meat eating argument are stronger than the anti-abortion
argument. While a defender of the anti-meat eating argument
may remain agnostic or even doubtful of the success of the
anti-abortion argument, proponents of the anti-abortion argument have to be, on grounds of moral consistency, proponents
of the anti-meat eating argument: the very same considerations
they appeal to to justify their impairment argument apply to
the impairment argument in defense. This paper thus extends a
“pro-life” position based on the impairment argument against
abortion to sentient non-human animals.
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